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Exploring the Legacies of Armed Rebellion 
in Burundi’s Maquis par Excellence
Tomas Van Acker 
Abstract: This contribution explores the legacies of armed rebellion in 
post-war Burundi, where two of the main political parties, the ruling 
CNDD-FDD and the FNL, are former rebel movements. It aims to add 
a micro-political perspective to the discussion on the transformation of 
rebel groups into political parties, and bring some nuance to the norma-
tive underpinnings of this debate. Based on observations of the role of 
local leaders with an FNL past, and of retrospective popular appreciation 
for wartime governance by the FNL in its stronghold of Bujumbura 
Rural, the paper argues that beyond the symptoms of a violent political 
culture, this legacy should also be understood as a complex source of 
post-war power and legitimacy. 
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The 2000 Arusha Peace Agreement heralded the end of decades of violent 
ethnic conflict and a full-fledged civil war that had started seven years 
earlier in Burundi. However, the two main Hutu rebel groups fighting the 
Tutsi-dominated institutions were not signatories to the deal. The integra-
tion of these groups into the peace process took several more years, and 
their recognition as political parties was only formally achieved in 2005 for 
the Conseil National Pour la Défense de la Démocratie – Forces pour la 
Défense de la Démocratie National (National Council for the Defence of 
Democracy – Forces for the Defence of Democracy, CNDD-FDD), and 
in 2009 for the Forces Nationales de Libération (National Forces of Liber-
ation, FNL). The groups have since emerged as the most important politi-
cal formations in Burundi. However, as recent evolutions in Burundian 
politics have amply demonstrated, the challenges involved in formally 
transforming into mainstream political parties continue to impact post-war 
political stability and security in Burundi. 
The impact that this rebel past has had on the increasingly violent 
political arena since the end of the war is a topic of much debate in Bu-
rundi. Several characteristics of governance in the post-war era are often 
portrayed by its critics as symptomatic of the belligerent background of 
the now ruling CNDD-FDD. Since its victory in the 2005 elections, 
power in this party has become increasingly concentrated in the hands of 
the former rebel leadership. A number of these individuals also control 
important instruments of the state’s security apparatus, such as the police 
and the intelligence services (Vandeginste 2009). Additionally, the role of 
the CNDD-FDD’s Imbonerakure1 youth league in policing the public 
space and in keeping that space closed to opposition-party activity has 
become a major cause for concern. 
In recent years, an emerging body of scholarship has looked into the 
transformation of armed movements into political parties, and their role in 
post-war settings. Prominent themes within this literature include the con-
ditions that explain the success or failure of these transformation processes 
(Söderberg Kovacs 2007; De Zeeuw 2008; Jones 2013), the organisational 
challenges for party building (Manning 2007), and the consequences of 
these transformations for post-war democratisation and stability (Söder-
berg Kovacs 2008). Apart from these comparative studies, several partic-
ular cases of rebel-to-party transformations have been analysed from these 
perspectives as well, with Jones (2013) and Nindorera (2008, 2012) focus-
ing on the CNDD-FDD’s transformation in Burundi, and Alfieri (2014) 
taking a more socio-political look at the trajectory of the FNL.  
1  Kirundi: “those who see ahead.” 
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According to Berdal and Ucko (2009), the post-war reintegration of 
insurgent groups entails more than their mere formalisation into political 
parties in order to partake in elections. Understanding these processes 
should also take into account the wider range of spaces in which rebel 
groups can continue to operate after the war. Berdal and Ucko (2009) 
argued for an approach that considers the continuities that persist during 
the passage from war to peace. The present paper aims to do just this by 
providing a localised, ethnographic perspective on the afterlife of rebellion 
in Bujumbura Rural, a stronghold of the FNL. It seeks to understand the 
legacies of rebellion through local narratives about the wartime presence of 
the FNL and to show how the nature of the FNL’s interactions with the 
population during the war continues in the present day both to shape 
people’s relationships with the party and to define the party’s legitimacy 
and its role in local governance. As such, the paper also engages with 
scholarship on rebel governance and provides insights relevant for the 
study of public authority in post-war settings. Although I recognise the 
reliance on wartime military networks and on retaining a capacity for vio-
lence as important elements in both parties’ post-war repertoires, I argue 
that legacies of armed rebellion should also be understood beyond the 
symptoms of violent politics, as a complex source of post-war legitimacy. 
In doing so, the aim of this study is to transcend the often normative 
focus on “success” or “spoiler potential” that characterises much of the 
literature on rebel transformations. The study also brings a subnational, 
micro-political perspective to this field, which is mostly concerned with 
the fate of former rebellions on the level of formal national politics.  
After briefly discussing the data upon which this paper is based, the 
next section examines the post-war trajectories of the FNL and the 
CNDD-FDD, their impact on politics and society in Bujumbura Rural, 
and the role of violence in their repertoires. The main part of this paper 
will focus on the FNL, analysing this movement’s historical presence 
during the war in an attempt to elucidate its ongoing appeal.  
Space, Time, and Data Collection 
The insights in this article are based on fieldwork data collected between 
2011 and 2015 in the province of Bujumbura Rural2 within the frame-
work of a research project that aims to understand local dynamics of 
power, public authority, and legitimacy in Burundi in the aftermath of 
2  Bujumbura Rural is the former name, still commonly used, of what is now 
officially called the Province of Bujumbura. 
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rebellion. We used ethnographic methods such as interviews and infor-
mal conversation, as well as observation. The majority of interlocutors 
were randomly selected citizens. In addition, we relied on a number of 
targeted key persons in the community, such as local authorities, civilian 
FNL sympathisers, former FNL combatants, and sympathisers of the 
CNDD-FDD and other parties, as well as persons with no specific po-
litical affiliation. Given the polarised context and in accordance with the 
agreement with our interlocutors, data is presented anonymously. 
As its name suggests, Bujumbura Rural is adjacent to the Burundian 
capital of Bujumbura. It stretches from the plains around the estuary of 
the Rusizi River that forms the border with South Kivu in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (DRC), along its heartland on the steep slopes of 
the Rift Valley, to the small stretch of coastal plain on Lake Tanganyika 
south of the capital city. These geographical features explain its strategic 
importance as Burundi’s maquis par excellence during the war. Despite the 
CNDD-FDD rebellion forces briefly passing through, from 1998 onwards 
large parts of the province became strongholds of PALIPEHUTU-FNL,3 
whose domination of the area put pressure on the interim government and 
the peace process, and later on the first Nkurunziza government. Bujum-
bura Rural was the theatre of some of the fiercest confrontations between 
rebel forces and the Burundian army, especially after the signing of the 
Arusha Peace Agreement.  
The findings presented here are mostly based on data collected in the 
commune of Kanyosha, where our research covered all three administra-
tive zones and the majority of the commune’s collines.4 While we can safely 
assume that the findings are also valid for the neighbouring communes in 
the hills of Bujumbura Rural that were part of the movement’s stronghold, 
this localised perspective does imply that the insights presented here 
should not be used to generalise about the FNL’s wartime practices and 
post-war legacy. It is important to note that PALIPEHUTU-FNL was not 
as consistently present in other parts of the country – and where it was, the 
nature of its relationship with local populations may have been different 
than it was in Bujumbura Rural. Thus, the PALIPEHUTU-FNL move-
ment as a whole might well be perceived differently in other geographical 
areas within Burundi and the region. 
It is also important to mention that data was collected in a specific 
timeframe. While most parts of Burundi had experienced more than a dec-
ade of increasing stability, in Bujumbura Rural, it had been only a mere 
3  PALIPEHUTU = Parti pour la Libération du Peuple Hutu (Party for the Liber-
ation of the Hutu People).  
4  The colline (“hill”) is the most basic administrative entity in Burundi. 
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three years since the demobilisation of the FNL and the end of hostilities. 
Thus, many of the insights on the relationship between rebels and the local 
communities are based on retrospective, albeit still relatively fresh material. 
Also, at the time of data collection, the FNL’s situation, on both local and 
national levels, was very much in flux.  
Elections, Violence, and Local Governance in 
Bujumbura Rural 
As the CNDD-FDD went on to become the country’s most important 
political outfit, effectively ruling Burundi since the 2005 elections, PAL-
IPEHUTU-FNL continued to fight, now against a Hutu-led government. 
It laid down its arms in 2009 after long and difficult ceasefire negotiations, 
just one year later taking part in elections. Importantly, in order to be able 
to obtain legal recognition as a party, the group dropped the historical 
“PALIPEHUTU,” an ethnic reference forbidden by the Constitution. 
Some of its troops and members of military leadership were integrated into 
the Burundian armed forces, but many of the fighters were not accepted 
for full-scale DDR (disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration) bene-
fits. In what was considered not a very good bargain for the movement, 
the FNL’s military and political leader Agathon Rwasa was awarded an 
official position as head of the National Institute for Social Security. In 
2010 the FNL participated in the polls, with Rwasa as its presidential can-
didate. Nationwide, it emerged as the second party in the local elections,5 
far behind the ruling CNDD-FDD, which received approximately 14 per 
cent of the overall vote. However, in most of Bujumbura Rural’s com-
munes the FNL won quite convincingly.6 Still, the FNL leadership ex-
pected a better result nationwide and, together with most other major 
opposition parties, boycotted the rest of the electoral process, claiming 
that the CNDD-FDD’s overall victory was based on massive fraud. Be-
sides paving the way for the CNDD-FDD victory in the following presi-
dential and legislative elections, this boycott also led to a post-electoral 
crisis. Rwasa went into hiding. In the course of 2011, the crisis worsened. 
While there was a nationwide crackdown against militants of opposition 
parties, especially those of the FNL, a number of attacks by unidentified 
5  Campaigning for these elections was largely based on presidential candidates 
rather than local candidates and programmes.  
6  In the whole province, the FNL secured 85 seats out of 165, far more than the 
CNDD-FDD’s 50 seats. 
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armed groups against government targets and targets affiliated with the 
CNDD-FDD gave rise to concerns that Burundi might return to civil war.  
The commune of Kanyosha was arguably the most affected by the 
2010 crisis, both in terms of security and concerning institutional stability. 
During fieldwork, it was still a highly contested political arena, in the grip 
of intense rivalry between the locally popular FNL and the national ruling 
CNDD-FDD. While the FNL was present in the commune for over a dec-
ade during the war, the CNDD-FDD’s presence during the war was more 
limited, as it used its strategic position to carry out attacks on government 
positions or as a passage to its rear bases. Later, after signing a ceasefire 
with the transitional government, CNDD-FDD fighters engaged in joint 
operations with the Burundian army against the FNL in the commune. In 
the 2010 elections, after a relatively peaceful local campaign and the first-
ever Election Day, the FNL won the communal vote in Kanyosha con-
vincingly, securing 13 out of 15 seats. However, the subsequent withdrawal 
by the FNL meant that it was impossible to put in place a functioning 
communal council and administrator. This had serious repercussions in 
terms of service delivery to the population, as well as for the local admin-
istration’s ability to attract external funding to initiate development activi-
ties. The Ministry of Interior appointed two interim administrators until, in 
November 2011, Kanyosha became the last commune in the country to 
have a council installed. Eight of the 13 elected FNL candidates had mi-
grated to an unpopular, government-recognised wing of the FNL, and an 
administrator was also chosen from that formation. The one CNDD-
FDD councillor elected became the president of the council. However, 
these official institutions had little popular legitimacy and were vulnerable 
to corruption and machinations. The institutional crisis intensified as, in 
2013, under pressure from the president of the council, the administrator 
was dismissed for mismanagement, again provoking the intervention of 
the Ministry of Interior. FNL sympathisers interpreted these moves as sab-
otage stemming from the ruling party aiming both to demonstrate that 
people with an FNL background were not going to be able to govern the 
commune and to legitimise interference from the central state. 
Maintaining a Capacity for Violence  
in Peacetime 
A major concern for several countries regarding the role of parties with a 
rebel past is their capacity and propensity to resort to violence. In the case 
of Burundi, it is clear that being able to demonstrate and make use of a 
certain capacity for violence remains an important part of the post-war 
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repertoire of both the CNDD-FDD and the FNL. By keeping the military 
command structures alive and remobilising ex-combatants, both parties 
have shaped the post-war militarisation of politics in Burundi. This was 
also the case in Bujumbura Rural, where part of the FNL militant base 
remobilised during the 2010 crisis and engaged in anti-regime violence. 
However, it is important to stress that militarised politics has been a per-
sistent feature of postcolonial rule in Burundi and should be understood in 
terms of structural legacies of the single-party state (Van Acker 2015: 5). 
Interestingly, a phenomenon like the CNDD-FDD’s notorious Imbonerak-
ure youth league, which for many Burundians epitomises the ruling party’s 
rebel roots, owes much to the way that UPRONA’s JRR youth league7 was 
involved in policing and controlling the countryside (see, for instance, 
Laely 1995: 427). In fact, like many other rebel groups, both PALIPE-
HUTU-FNL and the CNDD-FDD copied several features of the political 
system they fought, both in terms of institutional architecture and regard-
ing the role played by violence and coercion. It should also be noted that 
in the era of liberal peace, former rebels have not been the only ones to 
resort to violence: in the aftermath of the 2010 elections, Alexis Sinduhije, 
founder of the Mouvement Pour la Solidarité et la Démocratie (Movement 
for Solidarity and Democracy, MSD) – a party rooted in Bujumbura’s 
vibrant civil society and media scene and which, upon its formation in 
2009, incarnated the aspirations of the post-war urban cosmopolitan gen-
eration – was linked by UN experts to Burundian armed groups in the 
DRC. An important faction of this party militarised during the 2015 crisis 
and has been a driving force in armed resistance against the Nkurunziza 
regime. Indeed, as Mehler (2007: 211) suggested, violence is a recurrent, if 
not dominant mode of electoral competition in Burundi, and it is not lim-
ited to (former) rebels. In the case of the FNL, Alfieri (2014) brought 
some nuance to the study of the role of violence, arguing that violence 
should not be seen as an essential part of the movement’s nature, but 
rather as a tool, mobilised across war–peace boundaries, in the context of a 
broader political project.  
Local Governance in Bujumbura Rural
after the War
After criticism from human rights organisations and international part-
ners, the intensity of repression against FNL militants diminished some-
7  UPRONA = Union pour le Progrès National (Union for National Progress); 
JRR = Jeunesses Révolutionnaires Rwagasore (Revolutionary Youth Rwagasore). 
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what in 2012, but the Rwasa wing of the FNL was still deemed illegal, 
forcing militants to operate clandestinely in Bujumbura Rural.  
Since joining the political mainstream in 2009, the FNL had had sev-
eral offices in different zones of Kanyosha. By mid-2012, however, there 
was almost no sign of Rwasa’s party in the public sphere. Infrastructure 
closed down and public meetings or other overt political activities came to 
a halt. Remarkably, the CNDD-FDD, which had proven to enjoy only 
limited popular legitimacy (if we judge from the 2010 ballots in Kanyosha), 
was the only party to have its flag raised in the commune’s administrative 
centre. Some of the FNL’s most prominent and powerful members were 
either killed or arrested, or had moved. Whereas the party’s public pres-
ence had been dealt a serious blow, our exploration of the informal dy-
namics of power and public authority that occurred in the commune indic-
ates that the FNL is still strongly embedded in the region and, against all 
odds, continues to leave its mark on local social and political life.  
A considerable amount of influence is exercised in Kanyosha by a 
range of individuals who are referred to as imboneza: leaders in the com-
munity. There are differences in the scope of their influence, some oper-
ating only on the hill level, while others are recognised members of the 
local elite and have an influence that goes beyond the limits of the com-
mune. But they all share certain important features. Most of these men 
and women play a prominent role in daily matters of governance. Some 
are, or have been, chefs de colline, but the most powerful are not part of the 
local administrative apparatus or recognised as politicians. Their role 
seems to correspond to what Bierschenk, Chauveau, and Olivier de Sar-
dan (2002) have called “local development brokers”: intermediaries be-
tween the community and external providers of development assistance 
and funding. Some are development entrepreneurs in their own right, 
initiating the provision of services to the population, from drinking-
water and sanitation facilities on their hill, to large-scale local health 
insurance. They have the capacity to mobilise resources, but also people 
– and thus an electorate. They are often approached to mediate and give 
their advice on a broad range of matters. As such, they operate as a 
shadow elite, exercising a considerable amount of influence on official 
decision making in the commune, and are often more powerful than the 
de jure authorities. 
While their rise to prominence in some cases happened earlier, most 
of these imboneza emerged during the war and had links to PALIPE-
HUTU-FNL, some as active members of its civilian wing, some as 
sympathisers or even combatants. Even though not all of these leaders 
operate explicitly as FNL agents, several did contribute strongly to main-
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taining the movement’s imprint on local politics and governance. 
Especially at a time when the party has to operate clandestinely, it is able to 
stay alive, mobilise its networks, and ensure that communication from 
different levels in the party continues to pass through.  
These individuals, especially those elected as hill authorities, were 
under a lot of pressure to join the CNDD-FDD, and a number of them 
did so. At the same time, influential positions in the commune, such as 
school managers, have been appointed to CNDD-FDD sympathisers. 
There are a number of ways in which the FNL has dealt locally with 
these pressures and with the operationally clandestine position it found 
itself in. After a period of retaliatory violence, militants began to adopt 
more subtle ways of resisting the CNDD-FDD’s attempts to make its 
mark on the commune. These included pretending to adhere to the rul-
ing party or to the new, government-friendly FNL wing. These tactics 
were sanctioned by the Rwasa wing, which recognised the security issues 
faced by its influential members. At the same time, there were also acts 
of subtle resistance, including boycotting meetings and rallies by the 
officially recognised FNL wing (which was increasingly considered an 
auxiliary of the ruling party). Another example was the boycott of travaux 
communautaires (a semi-obligatory policy of participation in public infra-
structural works) when these were being attended by high-ranking 
CNDD-FDD officials and militants dressed in T-shirts with the party 
logo. While some of these forms of resistance occurred spontaneously, 
others were more coordinated, and Rwasa’s FNL remained a consider-
able mobilising force among the population. 
Order, Ideology, and Intimacy: Memories of 
Daily Life in the Maquis
The FNL’s current uncertain legal status, the repression against its mili-
tants, and the fact that Rwasa had disappeared from Burundi’s political 
scene for three years clearly set back the party’s process of post-war integ-
ration. The resilience and ongoing popularity of the FNL that was mani-
fest after 2010 in Bujumbura Rural and beyond – as illustrated by the large 
crowds of supporters that greeted Rwasa upon his return in 2013 – does 
not seem evident at first sight. Since its inception, the FNL has undergone 
a number of transformations, split-ups, and name changes. The current 
emanations of the FNL all go back to Remy Gahutu’s PALIPEHUTU, a 
political movement that aimed to emancipate Burundi’s Hutu majority and 
contest the Tutsi domination of the state. Created in 1980 in the Mishamo 
camp for Hutu refugees in Tanzania, PALIPEHUTU’s origins go back to 
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diaspora student-activist groups that operated mainly from Belgium and 
Rwanda. PALIPEHUTU soon established networks in Burundi, but after 
only a few years an armed wing, the FNL, became operational, launching 
its first attacks in 1991. After the murder of the first elected Hutu presi-
dent, Melchior Ndadaye, his FRODEBU8 party created the FDD armed 
movement, which soon developed a proper political wing, the CNDD. 
Several PALIPEHUTU-FNL members migrated to the CNDD-FDD and 
became crucial to that party’s success (Jones 2013: 198). The CNDD-FDD 
managed to attract more resources and fighters than PALIPEHUTU-FNL 
and quickly became the more powerful rebellion, operating in large parts 
of the country as well as in the wider region. As the first movement on a 
national level to promote Hutu consciousness and denounce the Tutsi 
domination of army and government, the FNL was the forerunner of the 
FRODEBU party and of the CNDD-FDD and its offshoots. However, 
it has never been able to capitalise on this vanguard role in the Hutu 
movement. Moreover, its strategies during and after the peace process 
have sometimes been puzzling, even ending up working to the advantage 
of the CNDD-FDD’s rise to prominence. With the latter’s dominance 
over the state, the FNL’s historical claim to Hutu power has become less 
pertinent today. 
In the heydays of its armed resistance, from the 1990s until 2008, 
PALIPEHUTU-FNL gained notoriety as a fierce, determined, and ruth-
less rebellion. This reputation is as much based on its guerrilla fighting 
against its main target, the Burundian army, as on its involvement in a 
number of high-profile attacks on civilian Tutsi targets. Over the years, 
especially under the leadership of Rwasa, religion played an increasingly 
important role in the movement’s ideology and action. Elements of Old 
Testament symbolism (the revelation of a “promised land” for Hutu) 
were combined with a strict Evangelical-Protestant ethic that played an 
important role in the way the movement operated, both on and off the 
battlefield. These influences have contributed to the aura of mystery that 
is sometimes attributed to the FNL but also to the image of a funda-
mentalist religious group in the vein of Joseph Kony’s Lord’s Resistance 
Army (Romkema 2007: 72). When PALIPEHUTU-FNL laid down arms 
in 2009, this image of a cruel, savage, and irrational movement continued 
to speak to the imagination and dominate the perception of many Burun-
dians and other observers. 
8  FRODEBU = Front pour la Démocratie au Burundi (Front for Democracy in 
Burundi). 
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“Today we are mourning, because the party we
voted into power is not here.” 
However, the feelings described above are in stark contrast to the narra-
tives of residents of the communes in Bujumbura Rural. Enquiring about 
the relationship between the armed movement and its civilian environ-
ment during the conflict, another image emerges. A great number of the 
interviewees identified strongly with the movement and spoke in affec-
tionate terms about PALIPEHUTU-FNL and Agathon Rwasa. Even 
though it was widely recognised that there were abuses and coercion, 
especially in the beginning of PALIPEHUTU-FNL’s time in the area, 
people who expressed having suffered at the hands of the movement 
often also painted a more nuanced picture, recognising certain accom-
plishments. The dominant narrative that emerged is one of a close bond 
between the rebel force and the local community. In fact, for many in 
the commune, the later years of the civil war period, when the FNL 
dominated the region, are looked upon not just as a time of distress and 
breakdown, but also as a period of order, integrity, righteousness, trans-
parency, and mutual respect. Conversely, the current situation, in which 
the party’s future remains uncertain and faced with repression by the 
CNDD-FDD, is a source of frustration and sadness. 
In the seminal Purity and Exile, Malkki (1995) showed how narratives 
of Hutu victimhood were crucial in the “mythico-historical” worldviews of 
Hutu refugees in Mishamo, the camp where PALIPEHUTU was founded 
in 1980. Turner (1998: 23–24) argued that not only did these narratives 
emerge out of the social conditions of the camps, but that they should also 
be understood as constitutive parts of political ideologies. Furthermore, as 
the political context changed, both in the camps and in Burundi overall, 
PALIPEHUTU adapted these constructs. The movement saw Hutu as not 
simply subject to Tutsi domination, but also as victims of CNDD-FDD 
conspiracies (Turner 2010: 155). In a context in which CNDD-FDD re-
pression of FNL sympathisers was a tangible part of everyday life in the 
hills, it comes as no surprise that notions of subalternation and victimhood 
were also echoed in several conversations with FNL militants in Bujum-
bura Rural. It is tempting to interpret this as part of a longer tradition in 
which Hutu, and especially the FNL, have been cast as underdogs in pre-
vailing power relations, and it is not implausible that these kinds of narra-
tives continue to have legitimising potential. However, this in itself does 
not explain the mobilising power of the FNL in Bujumbura Rural today. 
As I will demonstrate in the following paragraphs, the FNL’s post-war 
legitimacy and power in Bujumbura Rural should be understood through 
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the way people there remember and (re-)evaluate their province’s cohabit-
ation with the FNL and the movement’s way of governing during the war.  
The nature of insurgent groups’ relationships with civilians and the 
structures that such groups put in place – in order to exercise authority 
over local populations and seek their collaboration, and to regulate eco-
nomic activities in the areas under their control – have received a con-
siderable amount of scholarly attention (Weinstein 2007; Mampilly 2007; 
Arjona et al. 2015). It is clear that rebel groups depend in some way or 
another on the civilian population in the territories which they seek to 
control, and therefore often need to establish relationships with local 
communities that are not determined by their capacity for violence and 
coercion alone. As pointed out by former local commanders of the 
movement, establishing good relationships with the local population was 
also part of PALIPEHUTU-FNL’s strategy when they arrived in Bu-
jumbura Rural in 1998. The following paragraphs will provide an over-
view of the approach of the movement towards cohabitation with and 
governance of its host communities, in order to demonstrate how the 
memories of these interactions, and of the order that the movement 
managed to establish during the war, continue to contribute to its appeal 
as a party today. 
“They were the only ones who worked for us.”
There are few first-hand wartime accounts of the way PALIPEHUTU-
FNL operated and evolved on the local level, of how it was organised, 
and of the nature of the relationship of both its civil and military struc-
tures with local populations and institutions in Bujumbura Rural, or 
elsewhere. However, ex-post impressions based on interviews with civil-
ians, ex-combatants, local authorities from the time, and long-time local 
members of the movement revealed a fairly coherent picture of the way 
PALIPEHUTU-FNL was embedded locally.  
While the conflict in Burundi was not about territorial claims, the 
ability to exercise a level of control over the plain and hills surrounding 
the capital was an important strategic goal for the rebellion, as it made it 
possible to put pressure on the government. It is important to note, 
however, that PALIPEHUTU-FNL never had total territorial control: 
official state authorities remained in place throughout the war, and gov-
ernment security forces were very much present in certain parts of the 
area. Nevertheless, as the following sections will make clear, the move-
ment was able to make its mark on many aspects of daily life in the 
communities during the war and assumed a number of sovereign func-
tions within the area. 
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Although no exact figures could be found regarding the number of 
local civilian cadres in the movement, and despite our interlocutors’ 
estimations varying too much to provide a reliable insight into this mat-
ter, it is clear that during the course of the war PALIPEHUTU-FNL’s 
civilian divisions were present throughout all levels of the state’s territo-
rial organisation, from the province through the commune, down to 
(according to several sources) all of the subsections of the hills in the 
commune. These divisions played an important role both as operational 
support for the combatants and in daily matters of local governance in 
the communes. Interviewees often used the term “administration parallèle” 
to describe the local institutional set-up of the movement, which was in 
place until demobilisation in 2009 in some places. In most communes of 
Bujumbura Rural, these institutions were able to build on the pre-war 
presence of clandestine PALIPEHUTU local committees, along with the 
movement’s youth league, the Jeunesse Patriotique Hutu (Patriotic Hutu 
Youth, JHP), and its women’s league, the Mouvement des Femmes Patri-
otiques Hutu (Movement of Patriotic Hutu Women, MFPH). These struc-
tures, which PALIPEHUTU ideologues saw as the vanguard of a new 
political system in Burundi, existed since PALIPEHUTU’s very inception 
in the camps in Tanzania and were later installed in many parts of Burundi. 
However, whereas these grassroots divisions’ basic role in the pre-war 
period was to spread PALIPEHUTU ideology, they grew and transformed 
considerably in function, having aided the war efforts of the movement’s 
armed wing since 1998. Therefore, even when most of the initial combat-
ants and members of military leadership were not native to the region, the 
movement had an already-existing local network to fall back on.  
The mobilisation of resources was one of the core tasks of the ad-
ministrative apparatus that PALIPEHUTU-FNL put in place, not only 
in Bujumbura Rural. There are no indications that PALIPEHUTU-FNL 
was involved in large-scale economic exploitation in the areas where it 
operated, whether in Burundi or elsewhere in the region. Substantial 
material and monetary support seems to have come from members of 
the diaspora, and sometimes from states (the Rwandan government 
before 1994) and armed forces in the region (Romkema 2007). But civil-
ian contributions were essential for sustaining the rebellion’s local pres-
ence in the community and for supporting the broader war effort in 
other places, as well as for buying guns and ammunition. In addition to 
supplying food to the combatants stationed on the hill, often voluntarily, 
families and local business were also making regular monetary contribu-
tions so that the troops could buy additional food and cover other daily 
expenses, such as medication. Other resources were extorted from the 
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communal authorities and humanitarian agencies. Transport operators 
passing through the area also paid “taxes.” 
While many people experienced these contributions as a burden, it 
was also reported that there was often space for negotiation in cases when 
the amount could not be paid directly. And even if large parts of the 
community clearly considered this taxation by the movement to be coer-
cive, the tax also seemed to be relatively uncontested by the interviewees, 
who viewed it as part of a reciprocal relationship. In fact, integrity and 
transparency are two qualities that were often associated with the exercise 
of public authority by PALIPEHUTU-FNL. For example, the group took 
care to show that the organisation of these taxation practices was not arbi-
trary. The group communicated clearly about amounts and timings, and 
provided official PALIPEHUTU-FNL receipts as proof of payment. The 
administrative entities of the movement did not have offices as such, but 
did utilise paraphernalia of officialdom, such as receipts and stamps, and 
issued documents explaining the pertinent rules and structures, all with the 
movement’s official logo on them. Mampilly (2015) identified similar sym-
bolic practices of re-enacting the state by rebel movements, and argued 
that they are both part of a legitimising strategy and a way to ensure civil-
ian compliance. 
Co-optation of existing state-recognised local authorities on the hill 
level (chefs de colline), was another important part of PALIPEHUTU-FNL’s 
strategy to govern the local communities. These chefs received training and 
guidance from the movement in order to mobilise, organise, and teach the 
families on the hills. They played an important role as intermediaries be-
tween the civilian population and the local command post, but also be-
tween the rebels and the higher-level local state authorities and administra-
tive personnel in the commune. As several interviewees noted, many of 
these local officials worked for the state during typical business hours but 
were at the service of the rebellion afterwards. These blurred lines between 
the official local state and the rebellion were a crucial factor during the 
war, and the legacy of that blurring continues to play a big role today: as 
indicated above, several of these hill chefs are still in office or occupy other 
positions in the commune and, just like other cadres from the movement’s 
civilian wing, continue to enjoy legitimacy.9  
Several scholars have looked into the provision of security and justice 
in the governance repertoire of rebel groups (see, for instance, Raeymakers 
2007 and Förster 2015). Whereas these arrangements often have the po-
9  It is difficult to obtain exact figures, as hill chefs were under pressure to adhere 
to the CNDD-FDD and to deny being involved with the FNL.  
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tential to become mere protection rackets, providing security and justice – 
core tasks associated with the state – can also be an important legitimation 
strategy for rebel groups seeking the cooperation of host civilian popula-
tions. In the case of the FNL in Bujumbura Rural, these activities had both 
strategic and political objectives. It was important for the FNL to minimise 
the physical suffering and material loss amongst the host population on 
which it relied; however, as one local commander said, there was also a 
need to demonstrate to the population that PALIPEHUTU was capable 
of doing better than the government and the army. Many of our interloc-
utors spoke of the positive role the movement played in policing and 
providing justice. On the hill level, PALIPEHUTU-FNL cadres mediated 
conflicts between family members and neighbours and set up informal 
courts that administered verdicts and imposed penalties. Here as well, 
official documents were issued. In case the verdict was not accepted by 
one of the parties, a copy of the verdict with motivation was sometimes 
provided for referral to another, official jurisdiction. 
PALIPEHUTU-FNL’s role as moral police was highlighted and ap-
preciated by many. Under Rwasa’s leadership, the ideology and discourse 
of the movement became increasingly influenced by Evangelical ethics, 
which informed both the movement’s internal code of discipline and the 
way it sought to create order and provide justice in the communities. 
Much to the appreciation of many people in the commune, the group 
took a particular interest in dealing with cases of adultery, prostitution, 
premarital relationships among youth, gambling, and alcohol abuse. As 
was also the case with the rebel-organised security provisions in Northern 
Côte d’Ivoire described by Förster (2015: 116), FNL security practices 
made everyday life in Bujumbura Rural – when there was no fighting going 
on – safer for most people. 
Another important element of the local appreciation of PALI-
PEHUTU-FNL was the strong internal discipline of the movement, 
based on austerity and sobriety. This was often compared to the more 
abusive behaviour of the Burundian Armed Forces and of the CNDD-
FDD. Members of the fighting force were forbidden from drinking, 
having sexual relationships, and stealing from the population. Abuses 
against civilians by FNL fighters were not exceptional in the beginning. 
These abuses could be reported through the chef de colline or members of 
the youth wing, who played an important role in policing and surveillance, 
both in the community and within the movement. Sentences, often carried 
out publicly, ranged from disciplinary measures or orders to pay fines to 
imprisonment (sometimes in improvised, dug-out cages) and, for repeated 
or severe cases, such as treason, the death penalty.  
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In the interviews, among the most cited services provided by the 
movement was passive protection against abuses from government sol-
diers. Several people spoke of how the FNL recommended that the local 
population obey orders from the Burundian army soldiers as much as 
possible, without betraying positions of the rebel fighters, in order not be 
harassed. And there were several accounts of how FNL fighters in-
formed civilians ahead of planned attacks so that they could seek cover.  
“They treated us like humans.” 
Recently, a number of studies on post-war Burundi have pointed to the 
importance of ubushingantahe, a set of values that many Burundians believe 
should be at the core of political enterprise in Burundi. This complex, 
uniquely Burundian concept underpins the institution of the bashingantahe, 
councils of noble men who traditionally provided justice and functioned as 
the moral and political authorities on their hills. Sometimes translated as 
“integrity,” ubushingantahe refers to a broader set of ideals and virtues, in-
cluding righteousness, fairness, socialness, self-control, sagacity, responsi-
bility, reliability, honour, discretion, and equity. Ingelaere and Kohlhagen 
(2012) examined this notion to understand people’s expectations of (tran-
sitional) justice; they viewed it as an essential element of the social imagin-
ary of Burundians and as one of the organising principles of social exist-
ence. Similarly, in his study on the post-war experiences and perspectives 
of Burundian youth, Uvin claimed that these values are still deeply alive 
among Burundians, and saw in the concept of ubushingantahe a Burundian 
counterpart to the Western discourses of good governance and human 
rights. Basically, ubushingantahe conveys how people expect their authorities 
to treat them (Uvin 2008: 65). The importance of these values was also 
evident in my own research findings on the nature of public authority in 
Bujumbura Rural. 
As Ingelaere and Kohlhagen point out, the principles of bushingantahe 
are continually transposed in various contexts, as a framework for the 
appraisal of those who judge and rule. We do not suggest that this concept 
as such would be immediately applicable to PALIPEHUTU-FNL’s 12-
year-long presence in the area. Furthermore, none of our interlocutors 
explicitly stated that PALIPEHUTU-FNL, or individuals within the or-
ganisation, represented these values, or literally referred to this concept, 
and it was also not part of the FNL doctrine. Nonetheless, it is clear that 
the qualities that were attributed to the kind of order that the movement 
produced in the communes in fact do correspond to some of the main 
principles and values that underlie the concept. And, in a time of insecurity 
and distress according to the perception of a large part of the population, 
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the movement definitely seemed to come closer to embodying this ideal-
type than other state and non-state power holders did.  
“We lived together in the same houses,
like they were our brothers.” 
Shah (2013) argued that, apart from classical models of explaining rebel 
mobilisation and civilian participation in rebel-occupied areas – greed, 
grievance, and coercion, there are other processes at work in zones 
where rebels and civilian populations find themselves together. These 
have been largely underplayed in the literature. Writing on the Maoist 
insurgencies in India’s “Naxalite belt,” Shah highlighted the significance 
of relationships of intimacy between insurgents and the people living in 
guerrilla zones. While she clearly identified grievances and ideological 
considerations as relevant factors in people’s motivation to sympathise 
with or join the guerrillas, she also argued for a profound exploration of 
social relations between movements and local populations in order to 
understand the depth of the people’s engagement with the rebel forces.  
The narratives from Bujumbura Rural suggest that this notion of inti-
macy is well suited to capture the FNL’s wartime presence. Many people 
testified to the camaraderie, close bonds, and family-like ties that were 
formed between the rebels and the local community over the years of 
war. Beyond the legitimacy it derived from its governance actions, this 
“intimacy of insurgency” was another important aspect of the FNL’s 
success in mobilising the local communities behind its cause for such a 
long time.  
For Shah, the notion of intimacy is also closely related to ideology. 
Before taking up arms, PALIPEHUTU had taught its ideology in the 
communes of Bujumbura Rural since the mid-1980s. With an explicit 
focus on self-awareness and the emancipation of the Hutu population and 
its liberation from the Tutsi hegemony, ethnicity was at the heart of this 
ideology right from the start. As one influential member of the community 
put it:  
After the massacres in 1972, we Hutu felt broken and dehumanised. 
When the PALIPEHUTU came to us, they said: you are a Hutu, 
and you’re a beautiful person as well.  
This emancipatory ideological discourse played a crucial role in the 
movement’s nationwide appeal among the Hutu peasantry and was im-
portant for attracting new recruits (Uvin 2007: 5). It is clear that local 
popular solidarity with the movement should also be understood in 
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terms of the appeal of its ideology, as the predominantly Hutu popula-
tion, many of whom worked in the capital as day labourers, were ex-
posed to the exclusionist politics of the Tutsi elite on a daily basis. Simi-
lar to Naxalite rebels in India, PALIPEHUTU-FNL’s ideology contrib-
uted to a feeling of unity and community and seemed instrumental in its 
fighters’ gaining acceptance in their host environments as “one of them” 
(Shah 2013: 19).  
When PALIPEHUTU-FNL’s military wing arrived on the scene in 
Bujumbura Rural in the late 1990s, the majority of its leadership and 
combatants hailed from interior provinces and had few pre-existing local 
ties. Later on, local combatants also joined, often from among the JHP 
youth that had been assisting the rebellion. However, according to one 
local FNL organiser, these were still a minority, as the proximity to the 
capital meant that there were more economic opportunities and thus a 
smaller recruiting base. 
A crucial factor in understanding the presence of the FNL and the 
kind of relationships it developed in the area is that these visiting com-
batants basically lived among the families on the hills. The particular 
traits of the landscape itself in those very densely populated communes 
on the steep slopes bordering the capital, with little forest cover except 
for small patches of banana plantations, did not allow for large-scale 
deployment of troops or big bush camps. The rebellion operated in small 
units of fighters, with a military position on top of the hills and combat-
ants housed with host families. 
When not occupying their positions, combatants spent a lot of their 
time among the population, mostly dressed in civilian outfits, sharing 
food, playing games, helping on the fields, and engaging in prayer ses-
sions and small talk, but also teaching PALIPEHUTU ideology. As such, 
the FNL combatants, even sometimes the highest-ranking leaders, were 
part of the everyday landscape of social interactions on the hills, and 
their presence was very tangible down to the household level.  
In what seems a somewhat contradictory statement, given that the 
presence of the rebellion made Bujumbura Rural one of the most inse-
cure parts of the country, several people expressed that they felt pro-
tected by the rebels’ presence. The overall impression is that the move-
ment tried to accompany its host population through the war; for in-
stance, when they advised people to cooperate with government forces 
in order to avoid getting harassed. However, some civilians who assisted 
the movement during the war proudly described a sense of complicity. 
These sentiments are also expressed by the movement’s former fighters. 
A number of non-local former combatants have settled in the region and 
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continue to live and work among the host families. As one of them 
stated: “We have stayed here because we feel respected, protected, and 
cared for.” Similarly, several interlocutors nostalgically deplored the fact 
that these relationships could no longer be trusted given the CNDD-
FDD’s offensive to co-opt FNL members and coerce ex-combatants into 
cooperating with the intelligence services after the 2010 crisis.  
Conclusion 
In Burundi, the two main rebel groups involved in the civil war have 
become political parties. Their trajectories differ greatly. The CNDD-
FDD has established itself as the ruling party for more than a decade. 
The FNL, on the other hand, has struggled to survive as a formal party 
despite its considerable militant base. These two parties have been pro-
tagonists in a political crisis that started in 2010 and exploded in 2015. 
While this resurgence in political violence cannot be causally explained 
by the rebel pasts of these parties, the resilience of wartime rebel com-
mand structures and networks of former combatants has profoundly 
shaped the dynamics of post-war political violence in Burundi, both on 
the national and subnational levels. 
However, it is important to understand the legacy of former rebel-
lions in post-war settlements beyond the often normative underpinnings 
of much of the academic and public debate on the subject. The insights 
from this micro-political perspective on the afterlife of the PALIPE-
HUTU-FNL rebellion in Bujumbura Rural show how a rebel past can also 
be an important and complex source of post-war legitimacy and power.  
An important dimension here is the resilience of the civilian net-
works of support that the movement established during the war. Even 
though the FNL’s formal structures are weakened and fragmented, and 
the party has gone underground, these networks are still making their 
mark on socio-political life on the hills. A number of individuals have 
emerged from these wartime rebel structures to become influential in-
formal leaders today. They play an important role in everyday govern-
ance in the former rebel strongholds, but also in keeping the FNL rele-
vant as a party in a context of electoral competition, administrative re-
pression, and the persecution of its members. Typically, in interventions 
that have aimed to support the integration of rebel movements into 
mainstream politics, actions have focused on DDR programmes for 
combatants, or on the assistance of the elite leadership, and these local 
civilian institutions developed by rebel groups are often neglected. How-
ever, the insights from the FNL case suggest that these can be an im-
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portant form of political capital for parties with a rebel past, and we 
believe that this is an interesting area for further research that can 
broaden our understanding of the role of former rebellions in post-war 
political settlements. 
Furthermore, the analysis of the way PALIPEHUTU-FNL’s rela-
tionship with local society is remembered in narratives of the civil-war 
period also hints at less tangible, emotive aspects that continue to nour-
ish the charisma of the movement and its leadership, and are in this way 
an important source of its post-war social legitimacy. The memories and 
appreciation of the kind of order that the FNL managed to establish 
during the war are a testament to the close bonds that were formed be-
tween the movement and its host population, and the feeling of shared 
destiny that was part of the ideology. Moreover, the way the FNL ruled 
speaks to important Burundian cultural frameworks for imagining and 
appreciating authority. Here as well, we believe that further enquiry into 
the post-war appreciation and legacy of rebel governance practices and 
institutions is an interesting avenue for further research. 
By way of an epilogue, it is difficult to predict how long these 
memories of the FNL’s wartime presence will continue to contribute to 
the group’s survival. There are some examples of rebellions that can be 
thought of as historic losers but whose legacy continues to linger and 
provide legitimacy decades after the end of fighting (see, for example, 
Van Walraven [2013] on the Sawa rebellion in Niger). Burundi’s current 
political situation remains very unpredictable. In the communes under 
study, FNL militants have reacted with mixed feelings to Rwasa’s capri-
cious positioning during the crisis that started in 2015. After first calling 
for a boycott of the vote, which was to some degree respected in Bu-
jumbura Rural, Rwasa agreed to join Parliament and be part of the gov-
ernment. Many of the people who had been at the forefront of FNL res-
istance against the CNDD-FDD in Bujumbura Rural in recent years, at 
serious risk to their lives, were disappointed by Rwasa’s decision, especially 
given that, in the meantime, the CNDD-FDD had tightened its grip on 
local institutions through the communal elections. The generational divide 
that is increasingly affecting Burundian politics also seems to determine 
reactions within the FNL regarding the party’s position in the current 
crisis. While many of the older guard in Bujumbura Rural seem prepared 
to stick with Rwasa, a significant number of young militants and former 
combatants joined the ranks of anti-Nkurunziza protestors and the urban 
guerrilla movement in 2015. Interestingly, several of those young FNL 
militants told us they still considered themselves part of the FNL, but now 
were ready to rally behind the MSD’s Sinduhije or the failed putsch leader 
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Godefroid Niyombare. Although the verdict is not in yet, it is clear that 
the ongoing crisis might have significant consequences for the longer-term 
viability of the party. 
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Das Erbe des bewaffneten Aufstands in Burundis  
Maquis par Excellence 
Zusammenfassung: In diesem Beitrag wird untersucht, inwieweit das 
politische Erbe des bewaffneten Aufstands in der Nachkriegsgesellschaft 
Burundis nachwirkt, wo zwei der wichtigsten politischen Parteien, die re-
gierende CNDD-FDD und die FNL, aus früheren Rebellenbewegungen 
hervorgegangen sind. Der Autor möchte die Diskussion zur Transforma-
tion von Rebellengruppen in politische Parteien durch eine mikropoliti-
sche Perspektive ergänzen und zugleich die normative Seite der Debatte 
nuancieren. Aus seinen Beobachtungen zur Rolle lokaler Führungspersön-
lichkeiten mit FNL-Vergangenheit und aus der Popularität der Verwal-
tungsstrukturen der FNL während des Krieges in ihrer Hochburg Bujum-
bura Rural folgert er, dieses Erbe des Krieges sei nicht nur Symptom einer 
politischen Kultur der Gewalt, sondern müsse auch als eine differenziert 
zu bewertende Quelle von Macht und Legitimität in der Nachkriegsgesell-
schaft Burundis gesehen werden. 
Schlagwörter: Burundi, Politisches System, Parteiengeschichte, FNL, Bür-
gerkrieg, Guerillaverbände 
